Two decades of informative research has asserted that legitimacy attainment is essential to the survival and growth of emerging ventures, yet little empirical research has been conducted to either (a) validate the notion that emerging ventures transition from pre-legitimacy to legitimacy, or (b) identify when such a transition happens for the average new venture. Hence, the present research seeks to begin bridging this substantial gap by introducing and testing the notion that a financial legitimacy threshold (FLT) exists within emerging ventures. Using attainment of financing as a proxy for initial legitimacy, we test our hypothesis that an FLT exists on two large, independent data sets-the 1998 (N = 3,033) and 2003 (N = 3,751) Surveys of Small Business Finances. Results indicate that emerging ventures tend to finally transition to legitimacy and, thus, substantially shed external liabilities of newness at 12 years of age, 6 employees, and $379,000 in sales. Our findings that an FLT exists advance the literature by (1) suggesting that new venture legitimacy is a dichotomous variable that emerging firms either do or do not possess, and (2) articulating a point in size, age, and revenue that average emerging ventures must achieve before they are able to substantially neutralize external newness liabilities via legitimacy attainment.
Proposing a financial legitimacy threshold in emerging ventures: A multi-method investigation
Liability of newness (LON) is defined as a condition that hinders the development of new firms, due to a lack of stakeholder approval of their market offerings and other characteristics (Auster & Aldrich, 1986) . LON may be internal (i.e., struggles within the firm to create, learn, and consistently follow roles and operating procedures to create standard outputs), external (struggle to have the firm's market offerings/operations viewed as acceptable or appropriate by outside stakeholders), or both (Hunt & Aldrich, 1996; Scott, 1994) . Answering the question of how new ventures overcome LON has challenged researchers for several decades. Over that timeframe, many scholars, including Stinchcombe (1965) , have asserted that the most important way such ventures overcome LON is by receiving judgments of appropriateness from stakeholders-that is, by being granted legitimacy (Choi & Shepherd, 2005; Wiklund, Baker, & Shepherd, 2010) . This present paper builds on extant work by introducing and empirically testing the notion that newly established firms may be able to substantially neutralize external LON by successfully navigating a financial legitimacy threshold.
Legitimacy, in this context, is defined as, "… a social judgment of acceptance, appropriateness, and desirability, [that] enables organizations to access other resources needed to survive and grow" (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 414) . Research on the new venture legitimacy construct has become an important focus in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Überbacher, 2014) , and scholarly work in this area has made several advances. We now are aware of multiple typologies of venture legitimacy (e.g., Bitektine, 2011) as well as the strategic actions entrepreneurs can take to enhance their firm's chances of being legitimized (e.g., Delmar & Shane, 2004) . Additionally, we have a solid grasp of the benefits for new ventures that result from being deemed as legitimate by stakeholders (e.g., Choi & Shepherd, 2005; along with the processes that stakeholders use when conferring legitimacy judgments on new and emerging ventures (e.g., Wiklund et al., 2010) .
We also know that attaining legitimacy for new and emerging ventures is exceedingly difficult (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965) . Unlike older and larger firms-where incrementally increasing a base of legitimacy, once attained, is relatively easy-most new and emerging firms exist precariously, since they are at the beginning of the organizational life cycle (Delmar & Shane, 2004; Rutherford & Buller, 2007) . Related to this, some scholars submit that there exists a threshold of legitimacy that demarcates new firms from 'not new' firms (Brush, Manolova, & Edelman, 2008; Reast, Maon, Lindgreen, & Vanhamme, 2013; Rutherford & Buller, 2007; Townsend & Hart, 2008; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) .
Though the existence of this demarcation seems to be accepted, scholars have not yet searched for specifics regarding this threshold-at least not empirically. We do not know how, and when, these ventures actually transition from pre-legitimacy to legitimacy. Searching for the actual point in time (with associated venture characteristics) when an emerging venture transitions from pre-legitimacy to legitimacy is of critical importance, as legitimacy is related to a firms' ability to obtain access to the stable sources of financing that are often necessary for the venture to sustain operations and grow effectively. Therefore, while new venture legitimacy has emerged as an important area for entrepreneurship research, it is problematic that few boundary conditions have been formed around this construct. The lack of such boundaries makes additional theorizing and application challenging (e.g., Bitektine, 2011; Brush et al., 2013) .
Expressed differently, if legitimacy attainment is indeed critical for emerging firms-which certainly appears to be the case-at what point in a firm's existence does it move from pre-legitimacy to legitimacy? Without establishing boundary conditions around this transition, its epistemological and practical value is reduced (e.g., Tost, 2011) .
The present research seeks to begin filling this troubling void in the literature by proposing and testing the notion that a financial legitimacy threshold (FLT) exists in emerging ventures (e.g., Rutherford, Buller, & Stebbins, 2009 ). In our exploration of the boundary conditions of new venture legitimacy, we adopt Zimmerman and Zeitz' (2002) conceptualization of the legitimacy threshold (LT) as the point, "below which the new venture struggles for existence and probably will perish and above which the new venture can achieve further gains in legitimacy and resources" (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 427) . Multiple theoretical and practical contributions emerge from our work.
First, and most importantly, we explore the boundary conditions of new venture legitimacy. Our findings provide insights into identification of when, and with what characteristics, emerging firms are typically able to substantially neutralize external liabilities of newness. Extant (and largely anecdotal) research typically identifies successful attainment of legitimacy in hindsight (Khaire, 2010) . Therefore, our research into a priori identification of this legitimacy point is a benchmark against which subsequent work can develop further theory and hypothesis testing about legitimacy pursuit and attainment. We do this by focusing on one key stakeholder group-financiers. While all external stakeholder groups (i.e., customers, government agencies, financiers) will evaluate emerging ventures prior to granting legitimacy and providing resources, financiers will likely follow the most rigorous evaluation process when judging legitimacy, because financiers will likely have the most to lose if they grant legitimacy and resources to a pre-legitimate firm (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003) . Hence, we assert that once emerging firms have been granted legitimacy by financiers, such firms have likely successfully navigated the LT and substantially neutralized external LON.
Second, our work enables theory advancement in literatures on institutional theory (Suchman, 1995) , effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001) , bricolage (Baker, 2007) , and bootstrapping (Winborg & Landstrom, 2001 ). With our benchmark characteristics identified, these areas can now put more concrete assumptions around the much-needed resources that are critical to enabling venture emergence and growth. Furthermore, the findings of our investigation will enable future studies to examine both when (i.e., moderation) and by what mechanisms (i.e., mediation) certain levels of size (e.g., number of employees, revenue) and age must typically be reached before new ventures are able to substantially neutralize external liabilities of newness.
Finally, our data provide a relevant framework for practitioners, in which future work can identify the most effective strategies for firms to use before and after reaching the legitimacy threshold. For example, knowing the average size and age where firms are able to attract stable financing will help entrepreneurs make informed decisions about resource levels prior to startup.
It may also help entrepreneurs avoid escalation of commitment and sunk costs that result from dedicating resources to a failed business model. In the following sections, we review the relevant literatures related to these theory-based and practical contributions.
Theoretical Framework
To accomplish our goal of identifying a financial legitimacy threshold (FLT), we outline the theory on new venture legitimacy and the financial growth cycle (FGC). Utilizing logic and theory developed by new venture legitimacy scholars, we are able to outline the case for the existence of the FLT. The genesis of this theoretical case is based on two tenets of legitimacy from institutional theory. First, new ventures must be granted legitimacy judgments by stakeholders-new ventures cannot take legitimacy . Second, when making judgments of legitimacy, stakeholders do not judge a new firm's legitimacy on a spectrum-new firms are deemed either legitimate, or not (Bitektine, 2011) . These tenets led Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) to conclude, "An organization must achieve a base level of legitimacy that is dichotomous-it either does or does not meet the threshold" (p. 428). The authors, though, stop short of offering a prediction as to when or where the event may happen, and that is the focus of the present work. Related research from finance also supports the notion that an FLT exists. The FGC (e.g., Berger & Udell, 1998 , 2006 holds that there are stages of development with regard to financing in new firms and that these stages are measureable and noticeable.
New Venture Legitimacy
Seminal works by institutional theorists (e.g., Suchman, 1995) adapted the notion of legitimacy from sociology (e.g., Weber, 1947) and population ecology to explain phenomena in mature firms. In fact, legitimacy is chief amongst the foundational elements of institutional research (Tost, 2011) , and is often discussed as an outcome of cultural support that helps protect an existing firm from the external environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) . As a result, legitimacy is typically viewed as a way to overcome crises and negative press (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003 ).
An interesting development in the legitimacy literature has been the application of the concept to new firms (e.g., Aldrich & Martinez, 2001; Choi & Shepherd, 2005; Rutherford, Buller, & Stebbins, 2009; Tornikowski & Newbert, 2007; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) . New venture legitimacy has been of interest to entrepreneurship scholars for over two decades (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Nagy & Lohrke, 2010) . Overall, research concludes that legitimacy in the new firm has a different connotation than it does in the established organization (e.g., Rutherford et al., 2009) . This difference is due to the greater importance that legitimacy carries regarding the ability to obtain initial key resources necessary for the venture to establish itself, sustain operations, and grow effectively (Bitektine, 2011) . Overall, for an established organization, incrementally increasing legitimacy levels is much less difficult relative to attaining initial levels at the beginning of an organization's life (Delmar & Shane, 2004; Rutherford & Buller, 2007) .
Crucial accomplishments of new venture legitimacy research include differentiating the construct from the same construct in mature ventures (e.g. Tornikowski & Newbert, 2007) and proposing several typologies of new venture legitimacy (e.g. Bitektine, 2011) . Scholars have also conducted a small number of empirical projects on a variety of topics such as the strategic actions entrepreneurs can take to enhance their firm's chances of being legitimized (e.g., Delmar & Shane, 2004) , the benefits for new ventures resulting from being deemed as legitimate by stakeholders (e.g. Choi & Shepherd, 2005) , and the processes that stakeholders utilize when conferring legitimacy judgments on emerging ventures (e.g., Wiklund et al., 2010) .
Much has been done, but clearly there is much left to accomplish in the realm of new venture legitimacy (c.f., Uberbacher, 2014). We maintain that one way to move the field forward is by defining boundary conditions around the construct. Research has not yet developed robust theory-based logic that explains the specifics around emerging ventures' transition from prelegitimacy to legitimacy (Brush et al., 2008; Reast et al., 2013; Townsend & Hart, 2008) .
The Case for a Financial Legitimacy Threshold
A key precept of new venture legitimacy theory is that new businesses must be granted a base level of acceptance-an initial level of legitimacy-by a variety of stakeholders, before those stakeholders will provide resources to such firms (Choi & Shepherd, 2005; Khaire, 2010; Rutherford et al., 2009; Tost, 2011) . In other words, legitimacy cannot be taken by the entrepreneur-it must be granted by a stakeholder, typically a significant customer or financier (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001; Choi & Shepherd, 2005; De Clercq & Voronov, 2009a , 2009b (Brush et al., 2008; Reast, et al., 2013; Townsend & Hart, 2008) . Key to this assertion is that there is substantial universality (Rutherford & Buller, 2007) or "bandwagoning" behavior (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993) in legitimacy judgments. That is, groups of stakeholders will often make a collective decision regarding a firm's legitimacy, and this is the level of analysis used here-in short, we suggest that navigating the FLT is a key transition which can substantially neutralize external LON.
Overcoming external liabilities of newness. The dichotomous nature of new venture legitimacy creates a reality whereby external stakeholder groups-in particular financiersjudge the firm via an active due diligence process. This judgment process serves to determine whether the firm is appropriate and, thus, no longer significantly constrained by newness liabilities (Bitektine, 2011; Suchman, 1995) . In sum, external LON arises when characteristics of newly created ventures, such as their market offerings and operating procedures, are not viewed as acceptable or appropriate by outside stakeholders (Hunt & Aldrich, 1996) . Since emerging ventures do not likely have the internal and external systems necessary to compete with more established ventures, they are at a competitive disadvantage (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001; Stinchcombe, 1965) . As explained by Scott (1994) , new ventures are limited, because they do not possess understood social systems that guide the firm's stakeholders by establishing individual roles and rules of action. Hence, overcoming external LON is highly dependent on the emerging venture's ability to be granted legitimacy by a few key outside stakeholders (Tocher, Oswald, & Hall, 2015) . This is essential because once the emerging firm has been granted initial legitimacy by a few key external stakeholders, it will signal to other external stakeholders (i.e., the "bandwagoning" effect) that characteristics of the emerging venture (such as its market offering and operating procedures) are appropriate and trustworthy. This will likely allow the emerging venture to significantly neutralize external LON (Choi & Shepherd, 2005 ).
Although we focus on LON in the present work, it is important to note that a related set of liabilities-termed the liabilities of smallness (LOS)-also impact new ventures, for the simple fact that most new ventures are also small (Wholey & Brittain, 1986) . LOS and LON are confounded and correlated, and unique effects of each tend to be challenging to parse out; however, distinguishing characteristics can be drawn. Both types of liabilities can be mitigated by attaining legitimacy, but LOS is generally understood as exhibiting issues more directly related to lack of scale. That is, the relative absence of tangible resources that can lead to diseconomies of scale puts small ventures at a disadvantage relative to their larger counterparts.
For example, LOS is generally credited with making it difficult for new firms to attract skilled workers because of a lack of benefits and advancement options. Also, lack of scale results in cost disadvantages and lack of power when negotiating with suppliers, customers, and financiers.
Our focus is squarely on the financier stakeholder group (e.g., Aldrich & Martinez, 2001; De Clercq & Voronov, 2009a; 2009b) . Financiers will actively apply something akin to the net present value paradigm. That is, they will not grant resources unless they feel that the investment will result in financial gains to them in the relatively near-term (Brealey & Myers, 1991) . Since the granting of legitimacy and provision of resources by financiers involves either a contractual borrowing relationship or an ownership interest--neither of which are particularly easy to void, and both of which may harm the financiers' profitability and reputation if the emerging firm underperforms--financiers will likely perform the most detailed due diligence (Ardichvili et al., 2003) . While it is certainly true that investors often factor in 'softer' variables in making these judgments, we submit that the net present value paradigm dominates their judgment process.
Accordingly, the granting of legitimacy to emerging ventures by financiers is perhaps the strongest signal that emerging ventures have substantially neutralized external LON.
Financial Growth Cycle Theory
Also pertinent to the identification of an FLT is previous work conducted, largely by finance scholars, on the financial growth cycle. The literature focused on new firm financing is extensive, and often involves the debate regarding whether entrepreneurs target a specific debtto-equity mix (static trade-off) or whether they prefer internal funds to external funds ('pecking order') (e.g., Vanacker & Manigart, 2010) . In our work, we recognize the value added by this debate, but we look at the world of early-stage financing through a different lens.
Based on the notion of organizational life cycle theory, the collective view of growth cycle theory (Berger & Udell, 1998 , 2006 suggests that firms can be placed on a size/age/information continuum where the smaller/younger/more opaque firms, "lie near the left end of the continuum indicating that they must rely on initial insider finance…" (p. 622).
Building on work from finance (e.g., pecking order theory) and evolutionary theory (e.g., Aldrich, 1979) , Berger and Udell (1998) describe a condition where the financial needs and financing options change as an organization becomes larger, more experienced, and less opaque.
Consistent with an evolutionary perspective, growth cycle theory applies the concepts of natural selection and survival of the fittest to explain why some firms are selected by the environment and consequently survive, whereas others do not (Aldrich, 1979 (Aldrich, , 1999 Aldrich & Martinez, 2001 ). Specifically, Berger and Udell's model predicts that, as the firm grows, it becomes a 'fitter' firm and will gain access to financing sources such as venture capitalists and institutional loans. In the final stage of the growth paradigm, as the firm becomes older, more experienced, less opaque, and even 'fitter,' it also is more likely to gain increased access to even more stable financing sources (e.g., public equity, long-term debt). As with an evolutionary perspective, in growth cycle theory, some firms will be viewed as legitimate and others will not.
It should be noted that the literature on bootstrapping has found that, at times, an entrepreneur's choice of financing vehicle is not a function of legitimacy, but of personal choice (e.g., Winborg, 2009) . That is, entrepreneurs may intentionally choose to eschew external finance in favor of financing their firms from retained earnings or other internal sources. Work on pecking order theory also suggests this to be the case. In this, though, the literature is equivocal, as some bootstrapping scholars maintain that firms will utilize more attractive forms of financing as they become more legitimate (Ebben & Johnson, 2006; Rutherford, 2015) .
Moreover, work in static tradeoff theory indicates that entrepreneurs may relax this personal preference to seek out an optimal capital structure (Korkeamaki & Rutherford, 2006; Lopez-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008) . So, while it may be the case that these capital structure decisions reflect demand side issues (i.e., entrepreneurial preferences) as opposed to supply side (i.e., lack of legitimacy with financiers), we maintain that, for the average firm, the use of costly and nonideal capital sources (e.g., credit cards) is the result of a lack of legitimacy with financiers.
In new firms, their embryonic internal and external systems (i.e., newness liabilities) create information asymmetry between new ventures and stakeholders, hindering new firms' abilities to access needed resources (e.g., Brewer, 2007; Coleman, 2004) . Consistent with this line of thinking a number of studies find that, due to such information asymmetries, financiers who do provide funding to new firms must essentially price such concerns into the costs charged for the financing (Ebben & Johnson, 2006; Zhang & Wong, 2008) . This situation creates a reality whereby pre-legitimate ventures must rely on bootstrapping, seed financing from friends and family, and high interest funding such as personal credit cards (Winborg & Landstrom, 2000; Witt, 2004) . Once firms cross the threshold, though, they can receive better financing options.
The FGC is a stage model, and stage model theorists have long held that thresholds between various stages of progression must exist (Adizes, 1979; Smith, Summer, & Mitchell, 1985; Steinmetz, 1969) . Indeed, it is essential to a stage model view-for, if there are discreet stages of existence, then movement between those stages must be relatively abrupt and noticeable (Mintzberg, 1984) . Several empirical studies (e.g., Gregory, Rutherford, Oswald, & Gardiner, 2005; Murphy & Tocher, 2011) find support for the notion that new ventures emerge, and become legitimate, through a financial growth cycle as they expand and develop. These studies, though, artificially force firms into groups before analysis. Our approach in the present work allows us to search for configurations and thresholds without forced categorization.
Synthesis and Hypothesis
New venture legitimacy theory and growth cycle theory both suggest that noticeable and important transitions exist in the lives of firms that, when experienced, cause firms to modify operating procedures and strategic foci (e.g., Brush et al., 2008; Ebben & Johnson, 2006; Townsend & Hart, 2008; Winborg & Landstrom, 2000) . We build on this theoretical framework and suggest that navigating the FLT is the key transition that enables emerging ventures to substantially neutralize external LON (e.g., Reast et al., 2013; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) .
Specifically, we posit that new firms transition from a pre-legitimate stage (characterized by relatively unattractive financing options) to a legitimate stage (whereby firms gain access to more attractive financing sources). Also, since financiers are likely the most difficult stakeholder from whom to be granted legitimacy, we argue that consistent access to stable sources of financing is perhaps the strongest validation that emerging ventures have successfully navigated the FLT and substantially neutralized external LON (Rutherford & Buller, 2007; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) . Following this line of thinking, we specifically examine the (a) age, (b) size, and (c) revenue associated with the transition from pre-legitimacy to legitimacy in two large samples of emerging ventures. We focus on age, size, and revenue, as these characteristics of new ventures directly address issues related to external liabilities of newness and, thus, they directly impact perceptions of legitimacy (Delmar & Shane, 2004) . Accordingly, we submit the following broad research hypothesis: Research Center (NORC). The target population is the population of all for-profit, non-financial, non-farm, non-subsidiary business enterprises that had fewer than 500 employees, and were in operation as of year-end in 1998 and 2003. Response rates were approximately 30 percent for each survey. Businesses were contacted in advance of the survey to verify addresses and identify a contact person. After the initial contact, firms were contacted to complete a screener questionnaire. From the completed surveys, firms were sampled using stratified random design.
Each business selected for participation in the main interview was sent an advance worksheet to encourage the use of written records in responding during the interview.
As outlined below, results derived from the 1998 data will be cross-validated on the 2003 data. While data for both sets are collected in essentially the same manner (i.e., the sampling frames were the same), these data are not longitudinal; the same firms did not participate in both surveys. Put differently, these data are independent and not longitudinal-that is, the firms sampled in 1998 are not the same firms sampled in 2003; and, they are not matched over time.
1 While the data are certainly not new, financing data collected during this time frame should not introduce any systematic bias.
To this point, in 2014, the Kauffman Foundation surveyed a large group of small firms and listed the most common financing sources as: 1) personal savings, 2) bank loans 3) credit cards 4) family loans/loans from acquaintances, 5) loans from angel investors. These are the same sources accounted for in the present study.
Measures
As resources are the key to survival and growth of new and emerging ventures, this is where we begin our current investigation. Resource acquisition-financial resources-in new and emerging ventures is a staged process; that is, firms must pass through various phases (e.g., Berger & Udell, 2006 In applying cluster analysis and artificial neural network analysis (self-organizing map)-our grouping strategies described below-to the 1998 SSBF data, there was not a dependent variable. However, for the subsequent logistic regression analyses (on the 2003 SSBF data), the dependent variable was the financing grouping derived from the grouping analyses and the independent variables were the same as those listed in Table 1 . Tables 1, 2 , and 3 about here
Analytical Approach
Following counsel from Ketchen & Shook (1996) and others (e.g., Denzin, 1978; Jick, 1979) , we adopt a triangulation approach to optimally explore the location of the LT.
Accordingly, we engage two separate clustering (i.e., unsupervised learning) techniques: (1) kmeans cluster analysis, and (2) artificial neural network analysis (self-organizing map; SOM).
We followed a three-step analysis plan. First, we applied our two clustering techniques to the 1998 SSBF data to test our proposed categorization schema (i.e., legitimate vs. pre-legitimate), Second, we examined the significance of the models in the 1998 data, using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Third, we then used the 2003 SSBF data to validate our approach and findings from both clustering techniques and MANOVAs of the 1998 SSBF data.
Grouping Procedure #1: K-Means Cluster Analysis
K-means cluster analysis grouping procedure. We ran k-means cluster analysis on the 1998 data (N = 3,033). K-means is a popular approach and is particularly well-suited to analyzing large data sets, whereas other clustering techniques struggle to converge (Hatten, 1979; Rokach & Maimon, 2005) . This approach is an iterative categorization procedure that begins by dividing observations into a set number of clusters. Cases (in this study, new ventures) are grouped into a pre-specified number of clusters (K) based on some construct (e.g., source of financing) represented by their means. This procedure maximizes between-group variance and minimizes within-group variance. We chose k-means over hierarchical procedures, because the latter requires researchers to make many decisions in algorithm choice before running the analysis. That is, hierarchical clustering is appropriate when there are many 'knowns' regarding the data and its resultant structure. K-means does not require such choices. Thus, as we know very little regarding the outcome of the analysis-it is exploratory-a non-hierarchical (i.e., Kmeans) approach represents the appropriate choice (Andrews & McNicholas, 2014 ).
As we have little guidance from the literature regarding the precise location of the FLT, we searched for the most efficient solution (i.e., optimal number of groupings) by running the kmeans cluster analysis several times, each time specifying a different number of groups 3 .
Specifically, we ran the k-means cluster analysis nineteen times by specifying groupings ranging from 2-20. This is a necessary step in our k-means cluster approach, but is not inherent in the second technique we used (i.e., self-organizing maps), which is discussed later in this section. Table 4 contains the k-means cluster (top of Table 4 ) and MANOVA results (bottom of Table 4 ) for the 1998 SSBF data. The optimal solution is found by subjecting all grouping solutions to a MANOVA. The optimal grouping will maximize between group variance. The kmeans approach reveals that a three-group solution is the most robust and parsimonious (F = 2240.36, Wilkes λ = .02; p < .00). Consistent with our predictions, based on firms' age, size, and revenue, there are differences based on funding source. In particular, Group 1 resembles the prelegitimate group that we proposed would emerge. Firms in this group are younger and smaller than in the other two groups. Overall, firms in this group seem to have trouble attaining any type of financing vis-à-vis their more established counterparts. The firms in Group 2 are, on average, roughly twice the size of the firms in Group 1, but still relatively small. These firms appear to be making use of almost no financing, with the exception of trade credit. This group also represents the largest of the three groups. Group 3 is more likely to use virtually all types of financing, as opposed to the smaller, younger firms.
The subsequent MANOVA indicates that the following financing variables are effective discriminators among the three groups (Wilks' λ = .02, F = 2,240.36, p < .00): credit line (p < .00), trade credit (p < .00), loans from owners (p < .00), equity from owners (p < .05), bank loan (p < .00), and other institution loans (p < .00). However, personal credit cards, angel equity, VC equity, VC loans, and family loans were not significant discriminators.
Validation of the 1998 SSBF K-means cluster analysis in the 2003 SSBF. Using the results from the 1998 data using a k-means cluster technique and MANOVA, we then modeled the 2003 data in a binary logistic regression. The dependent variable here is based off of the groups derived from the cluster analysis (from the 1998 SSBF data). However, instead of using three groups to classify the 2003 data, we use only two-one for pre-legitimate organizations and one for legitimate organizations. We choose this approach because, consistent with our predictions, our goal is to find evidence of an LT with regard to financing. To create the cut-off for pre-legitimate firms, we constructed a 95% confidence interval around the means found in Table 4 , and took the upper bound as well as the lower bound (which was 0). The following criteria emerged for pre-legitimate status: 12 or fewer employees, 15 or fewer years for firm age, and revenue (in 2003) of less than $1,763,286. For the predictors in our model, we used each content (i.e., financing) variable that was a significant discriminator.
We display the results of the logistic regression in Table 5 . The logistic regression on the 2003 SSBF data demonstrated general support for our cluster-based groupings from the 1998 SSBF data. Firms with a line of credit, loans from owners, trade credit, bank loans, and loans from other financial institutions are more likely to be legitimate. Firms that have equity from owners are no more likely to be pre-legitimate than legitimate. The overall model is significant at the .00 level, and the Naglekerke R-squared is .17.
-------------------------------Insert Tables 4 & 5 about here -------------------------------

Grouping Procedure #2: Self-Organizing Map
Self-organizing map grouping procedure. Consistent with our triangulation approach, via a self-organizing map approach (Kohonen, 1990 (Kohonen, , 2001 (Kohonen, , 2013 , we derived an alternative grouping of firms to compare with our findings from the k-means cluster technique. This approach adds to our prior analyses as the self-organizing map technique addresses weaknesses inherent in the k-means cluster method, and we avoid having to specify the number of groupings (Mangiameli, Chen, & West, 1996; Rokach & Maimon, 2005) . Recent calls from researchers have urged scholars to consider the self-organizing map approach for use with large, relatively unstructured data in the domain of entrepreneurship (e.g., Janasik, Honkela, & Bruun, 2009 ).
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In short, a self-organizing map is a special type of artificial neural network that emulates the neural activity of an intelligent organism to perform functions, which are not necessarily objective in nature-they can be complex, subjective functions (Jain, Mao & Mohiuddin, 1996) .
The self-organizing map (Kohonen, 2013 ) is a topologically organized neural network based on biological neurons in the manner that they recognize complex patterns. A common example is the human brain's ability to recognize a person's face in a very short period of time. The brain takes in a large number of inputs about a person (e.g., nose, lips, complexion) through the senses and organizes them to recognize the person. Similarly, the self-organizing map process takes inputs, in the form of data, and organizes the data into a group, or groups, based on common characteristics.
The self-organizing map uses unsupervised learning to accomplish its goal of classification. In the context of this study, unsupervised learning refers to a procedure where there is no prior knowledge by the self-organizing map of how the data should be classified (Kohonen, 2013; Mehrotra et al., 1997) . This is contrasted with supervised learning, in which a neural network is trained to recognize the input as belonging to the correct group. This type of analysis-called back-propagation-is not suited for the present work (Mangiameli et al., 1996) .
Self-organizing maps are frequently discussed in relation to other clustering techniques (i.e., cluster analysis) used in statistical analysis. However, there are several points that separate the self-organizing map from other clustering techniques. Mangiameli et al. (1996, p. 402) conducted a study comparing Kohonen's self-organizing map with hierarchical cluster techniques, and showed that self-organizing maps have, "superior accuracy and robustness,"
when classifying large amounts of data. Specifically, cluster analysis has two primary weaknesses that stem from the lack of an efficient optimal solution methodology: (1) the inability to identify the number of clusters present in the data in an a priori manner, and (2) the manner in which observations are assigned to mutually exclusive clusters. Kohonen (1990) developed an efficient methodology to overcome these problems 5 .
Essentially, because of the iterative process used in self-learning, the a priori identification becomes a non-issue, because the researcher can set the number of initial clusters very high.
Upon execution of the self-organizing map procedure, however, fewer groups may be formed if the database does not exhibit enough 'separation' to justify the specified number of groups. The self-organizing map procedure solves the second problem by allowing observations in the selforganizing map to 'switch' groups from iteration to iteration as the neural network 'learns'.
Similar to our analysis plan using k-means cluster, we implemented a three-step approach using the self-organizing map procedure. Table 6 contains the self-organizing map and MANOVA results for the 1998 data. The self-organizing map reveals that a four-group solution is the most robust and parsimonious. Consistent with our predictions, one group-Group 1-emerged that resembles the pre-legitimate group that we anticipated would emerge. Firms in this group are younger and smaller than the other groups. Overall, firms in this group carry a balance on personal credit cards, utilize a fair amount of trade credit, and exhibit relatively high levels of owner equity. However, they do not make substantial use of credit lines, loans from owners, or bank loans. The firms in Group 2 are, on average, roughly twice the size of the firms in Group 1, but still relatively small. These firms appear to be making use of almost no financing, with the exception of trade credit. This group also represents the largest of the four groups. Group 3, also a large group, is more likely to use a credit line and bank loans. Group 4 is similar to Group 3, except that it is smaller and likely to have a loan from a financial institution other than a bank.
The subsequent MANOVA indicates that the following financing variables are effective discriminators among the four groups (Wilks' λ = .01, F = 799.94, p < .00): balance on personal credit card (p < .00), credit line (p < .00), trade credit (p < .00), loans from owners (p < .00), equity from owners (p < .00), bank loan (p < .05), other institution loans (p < .00), and family loan (p < .05). However, angel equity, VC equity, and VC loans are not significant discriminators.
Validation of the 1998 SSBF self-organizing map in the 2003 SSBF. Using the results
from the analyses of the 1998 SSBF data applying a self-organizing map, we then modeled the 2003 SSBF data in a binary logistic regression. In these analyses, to account for regional and industry impacts on the relationship, we control for both.
The dependent variable is based off of the groups derived from the self-organizing map
(from the 1998 SSBF data). However, instead of using four groups to classify the 2003 SSBF data, we use only two-one for pre-legitimate organizations and one for legitimate organizations.
To create the cut-off for pre-legitimate firms, we again constructed a 95% confidence interval around the means found in Table 6 , and took the upper bound as well as the lower bound (which is 0). The following criteria emerged for pre-legitimate status: 12 or fewer employees, 13 or fewer years for firm age, and revenue (in 2003) of less than $2,115,245. For the predictors in our model, we used each content (i.e., financing) variable that was a significant discriminator.
We display the results of the logistic regression in Table 7 . The logistic regression on the 2003 SSBF data demonstrates general support for our groupings from the 1998 SSBF data. Firms that carry a balance on personal credit cards are more likely to be pre-legitimate. On the other hand, firms with a line of credit, loans from owners, trade credit, bank loans, and loans from other financial institutions are more likely to be legitimate. Firms that have equity from owners are no more likely to be pre-legitimate than legitimate. The overall model is significant at the .00 level, and the Naglekerke R-squared is .225.
-------------------------------Insert Tables 6 & 7 about here -------------------------------
Discussion
The main objective of this study was to introduce and empirically test the financial legitimacy threshold concept--which represents a novel and useful framework from which to study the new venture legitimacy construct. Using attainment of financing as a proxy for initial legitimacy, we explored whether, when a population of firms was allowed to cluster by financing source, the smaller, younger firms-representing a pre-legitimate group-drew on less attractive forms of financing, relative to the larger, older firms, who were expected to draw on more attractive forms of financing, suggesting successful navigation of the FLT. Through the use of a multi-method analysis of two large datasets, we found that new ventures tend to finally transition to legitimacy and, thus, substantially neutralize external liabilities of newness at 12 years of age, 6 employees, and $379,000 in sales.
At first glance, the idea that the average firm may need to be in operation for approximately 12 years before it is able to substantially neutralize external liabilities of newness and consistently attract stable forms of financing is a bit puzzling. However, a solid body of research actually suggests new ventures take an average of 8 years to attain profitability, and up to 12 years before they resemble an established firm (Biggadike, 1979; Ensley, Pearce, & Hmieleski, 2006; McDougall, Covin, Robinson, & Herron, 1994; McDougall & Robinson, 1990 ). Additional studies (e.g., Zack, 2007) find that assets such as social networks and intellectual property-which are critically important to the reduction of external liabilities of newness-often take upwards of 10 years to develop. Finally, the fact that attainment of stable financing is used as the variable to assess the dissipation of external liabilities of newness may be another plausible explanation for the 12-year cut-off. Such an argument is based on the notion that financiers will likely be the most difficult category of external stakeholder from whom to be granted legitimacy; financiers have the most to lose and are the most negatively impacted if they are deceived by less-than-forthright individuals.
Overall, we submit that attainment of legitimacy is the key variable of interest and, once a new venture has attained legitimacy from financiers, that venture has made a critical transition in its evolution. It seems reasonable that it may take a substantial amount of time for most ventures to successfully navigate the transition across the FLT. Viewed from this perspective, while the 12-year cut off is somewhat notable, it also appears that extant research suggests that it is, indeed, reasonable.
We submit that the present findings provide strong evidence that an FLT does exist, and firms in the pre-legitimate groups have not yet navigated the point at which they can access stable funding sources. Therefore, while our study certainly cannot indicate specific moments when the FLT occurs for a given firm (nor does it guarantee that all firms must navigate it successfully to survive), we do assert that our findings provide support for the FLT's existence.
Theoretical Implications
Legitimacy, a social judgment of appropriateness, is a cornerstone of institutional theory.
When evaluating appropriateness, stakeholders want to perceive reliability and accountability in a venture (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) . Until this reliability (i.e., predictability) and accountability (e.g., documentation of internal systems) is perceived, external stakeholders are unlikely to judge a firm as legitimate. One clear inhibitor to the establishment of reliability and accountability in a given venture is its age. In order for a firm to be predictable and accountable, it must have enough history on which to base predictions. Similarly, it must have a track record that documents a past-as opposed to future-oriented pro forma documents (Wiklund et al., 2010) .
Accordingly, and all else being equal, an older organization is perceived as a more reliable organization. This is especially true for financially-oriented stakeholders, who must battle information asymmetry to gauge the quality of new ventures. As more information is better, and more mature organizations generally have more information available, the question remains: "When does a transition happen?" Accordingly, we explore how mature is mature? Or conversely, how new is new?
This topic has received virtually no empirical attention. This is possibly because theoretical work on legitimacy from institutional theory was drawn from, and meant to inform, mature firms. As a result, the vast majority of the literature assumes that a base of legitimacy already exists. Therefore, the current legitimacy theory literature is not fully prepared to accommodate the phenomenon of new ventures seeking legitimacy. Accordingly, we merge the limited literature related to new venture legitimacy with theoretical work on the financial growth cycle to provide a needed conceptual recalibration to institutional theory-one that enables it to accommodate the phenomenon of new ventures seeking legitimacy and subsequent resources via the legitimacy threshold concept.
A shared characteristic of virtually all emerging ventures is the lack of resources needed to survive and grow-accordingly, frameworks such as effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001) , bricolage (Baker, 2007) , and bootstrapping (Winborg & Landstrom, 2001 ) explore the efforts of entrepreneurs to acquire critical resources. Our findings provide a set of benchmark characteristics that enable these literatures to now put more concrete assumptions around the resources needed for venture to emergence and growth. Most importantly, though, we empirically illustrate at what stage an emerging venture begins to be viewed as acceptable, appropriate, and desirable-a shared social definition of legitimate, as evidenced by the acquisition of resources.
Practical Implications
Our findings suggest that entrepreneurs should develop awareness of their firms' statusas either pre-legitimate or legitimate-and plan accordingly. Entrepreneurs should be able to use such information to more effectively plan prior to launching their new ventures, and also to develop strategies to survive the pre-legitimate period of existence. For example, the finding that average ventures will not likely have consistent access to financing until the venture is approximately 12 years of age, employs around 6 people, and has roughly $379,000 in revenue,
should guide entrepreneurs to estimate the resources needed to survive up until that period. Such information may lead many entrepreneurs to save additional money prior to startup, and to consider financing options other than friends and family. Financing options open to prelegitimate ventures include micro-loan programs, crowdfunding, asset-based borrowing, factoring, fixed asset lending, and leasing. While pre-legitimate firms will likely continue to rely heavily on seed financing, entrepreneurs should realize that other viable options exist that may allow them to decrease dependence on unattractive funding sources (such as credit cards), may enable them to navigate the FLT, and may increase their chances of survival.
With regard to the further practical applications of the present work, related research indicates that a new venture's actions can influence external stakeholder decisions about whether or not to grant legitimacy (e.g., Choi & Shepherd, 2005; Holt & Mcpherson, 2010; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001) . Entrepreneurs can, and often do, engage in tactics or strategies to help mitigate liabilities of newness and smallness. Ultimately, these tactics are employed by an entrepreneur to assist stakeholders in making sense of the venture, thereby enhancing the chances that a stakeholder will deem them appropriate Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) .
These tactics range from the subtle to the overt-spanning from symbolism (Zott & Huy, 2007) to isomorphism (Suchman, 1995) to impression management (Nagy, Pollack, Rutherford, & Lohrke, 2012) . Sometimes, more deliberate acts are employed, such as deception (Pollack & Bosse, 2014; Rutherford et al., 2009) , pitching , and identity development (Petkova, Rindova, & Gupta, 2013) . By integrating the present findings with these extant lines of research, future work can more efficiently begin to provide advice to entrepreneurs about how to best 'act' in order to enhance their chances of being granted legitimacy from key external stakeholders.
One note of caution, though, needs mention with regard to the multiple external stakeholders that entrepreneurs must attempt to serve (i.e., financiers, customers, government agencies). We note that each of these stakeholders will view, and evaluate, legitimacy differently. For example, financiers will likely take into account the future value of the firm, whereas customers may focus on existing experts' evaluations. Government agencies, on the other hand, will focus more on compliance with historic norms and legal frameworks. As each group represents a crucial resource for the firm, we caution entrepreneurs that this study's findings are applicable primarily to financiers and other stakeholders may use different collective processes when making legitimacy judgments.
Limitations
We note the following limitations. First, these data are cross-sectional, from privately held firms in the United States, and we are not able to analyze causality or determine why emerging firms use particular financing sources, in clusters. For example, does a given firm choose to use credit card financing, or does it do so because it is denied access to other, less expensive, financing? Longitudinal research that follows the financing patterns of a sample of firms over several time periods will allow for more detailed examination of factors that allow new and small firms to successfully navigate the legitimacy threshold. Furthermore, there may be differences within each cluster as far as outcomes. For example, a firm achieving legitimacy due, in some part, to angel investor funding may experience different outcomes relative to a firm achieving legitimacy, in some part, from venture capital funding.
Next, as mentioned above, our study's conclusion that the FLT takes place at approximately 12 years of age, 6 employees, and $379,000 in sales should be interpreted as a starting point for future research on the FLT; it should not be seen as a precise prediction of where and when the FLT occurs. For instance, these numbers may vary according to industry competitiveness, geographic region, and market volatility, as well as deliberate choices made by the entrepreneur. Along these lines, we operationalize the legitimacy attainment process as a linear one-i.e., a firm is at one point not legitimate, and then it is (e.g., Hamilton, 2006) . In the future, however, a refined conceptualization of legitimacy may be needed. For example, can a firm lose its legitimacy once it is attained? Or, can a firm that is deemed not legitimate by one financier, be actually deemed legitimate by another. Answers to these questions, based on future empirical evidence, would greatly advance the literature.
Our conclusions are further limited by the fact that a survivorship bias is present.
Samples in this study consist of ventures that survived up to the point when the data were collected. Firms no longer in business at the data collection points were omitted. It would indeed be interesting to analyze a 'failed' configuration of financing. It is our supposition that these firms utilized even more seed financing than pre-legitimate firms, but we clearly cannot be certain without empirical evidence.
Similarly, our use of access to financing as a proxy for legitimacy creates the possibility that false negatives exist within our sample. Specifically, it is possible that a firm has been granted legitimacy by financiers, but it then did not attain stable access to financing. This could occur because a firm did not desire external funding or because a financier simply decided against granting resources-even though the firm was deemed legitimate. Thus, while our proxy likely identifies firms that have navigated the FLT, there is a possibility that our proxy did not identify all legitimate firms in our sample. Given this, we encourage additional research that identifies and utilizes alternative proxies of legitimacy.
We also make the following note regarding attainment of funding as a proxy for legitimacy. Our analysis of two large data sets indicated that, within each sample, a prelegitimate group exists that is significantly more likely to rely on the seed financing source of credit card financing. While we recognize that many entrepreneurs cite a preference for autonomy as their motivation for avoiding external financing, it is difficult to imagine a situation where firms would choose to use personal credit cards over other less expensive forms of financing such as trade credit and thus we conclude that firms using credit card financing are almost certainly doing so because of a lack of legitimacy (Lee & Denslow, 2005 Next, scholars should consider examining whether the use of certain financing sources during pre-legitimacy influences the firm's chances to be granted legitimacy. Do firms using certain vehicles (e.g., government loans and grants, crowdfunding, micro-loans, factoring, leasing) during pre-legitimacy have higher survival rates than firms who rely exclusively on traditional seed financing? On one hand, the strained relationships that often result from friends and family financing may hinder a new venture's ability to gain legitimacy. That said, the red tape and increased regulations associated with financing obtained from government and nonprofit organizations may be more detrimental to the chances of new firms to navigate the LT.
Finally, as noted at the beginning of this paper, internal stakeholders (employees, managers, owners) assess LON based on factors such as the consistency and appropriateness of policies and procedures within the firm which outside stakeholders may not be privy to or are unable to assess (e.g., Scott, 1994) . Hence, it is quite possible that internal and external stakeholders grant new ventures legitimacy based on different factors and at different points in size and age. It is also possible that internal stakeholders may be seeking legitimacy from external stakeholders before they themselves have granted the new venture legitimacy (Rutherford, et al., 2009) . For example, the owner may need funding to purchase equipment needed to standardize operations and may not feel the firm will be legitimate until it can standardize. However, this same owner may try to convince outsiders that the firm is legitimate to gather the needed funding. Hence, future studies that examine if the threshold of legitimacy is significantly different for external and internal stakeholders are warranted. The firm used owners' personal credit cards to finance business expenses AND carried a balance (1=Yes; 0=No) Credit Line
The firm used a credit line to finance business expenses (1=Yes; 0=No) Trade Credit
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